Sunday, November 27, 2005
URGENT ACTION NEEDED - STOP DIEBOLD CERTIFICATION
CA Secretary of State Bruce McPherson continues to look for a way to certify Diebold election machines, no matter the evidence proving their flaws. Supposedly, tomorrow, Monday Nov. 28 is the deadline for public comment. Here are some vital links to assist you in standing up and demanding Democracy:
BlackBoxVoting.org posting from 11/17/05 - contains detailed explanations of successful exploitation of Diebold defects, including the GEMS central tabulator software used to count votes in Humboldt County.
California Voter Foundation report on 11/21/05 Diebold "no hearing" hearing in Sacramento (McPherson disbanded the Voting Systems and Procedures Panel leaving election reform advocates to testify before a group without any authority or even advisory capacity).
California Election Protection Network (CEPN) - home page currently has report on 11/21/05 hearing, plus background on Diebold and HAVA (may be outdated because there is no archived link)
BlackBoxVoting.org posting from 11/22/05 - very interesting announcement that McPherson has set up a public "test hack" for BBV experts; postings added from 11/25 on indicate the initial date of 11/30 has been postponed to a mid-December date still to be determined.
Oakland Tribune - 11/27/05 article confirming test hack will happen but conditions still being negotiated; article also confirms Humboldt among impacted Counties.
Agenda, Voting Systems Testing Summit 2005 - the wheels will keep spinning this Monday and Tuesday in Sacramento. Among the topics of discussion:
There is lots going on here at GuvWurld. Tomorrow morning I will release a follow-up on last week's GAO report analysis. Some local media have responded well and I expect some coverage this week. However, your insistence on thorough investigative reporting is essential. This community should not accept those who refuse to reveal or seek to hide the truth about the state of our elections. Revisit that post for a list of local media and government contacts. I'll be doing outreach to Humboldt County Supervisors tomorrow too, calling for support of both the GAO report investigation and the Diebold resistance.
And a final note on the overall election reform movement. Yesterday I posted about the Eureka Greens adopting the Voter Confidence Resolution (VCR). This happened without my involvement or knowledge. I believe this indicates the VCR has begun to take on a life of its own. Further, the CEPN reference above contains a section called the 7 Reasons Not To Certify Diebold. The first reason is the GEMS defect and it quotes (without permission or credit) two paragraphs from my GAO report analysis. Going a step further, Dan Ashby included the 7 reasons in the piece linked above, and he kept the two paragraphs with some minor word tweaks. This is in no way a complaint about plagiarism. Quite the opposite. What I see is that the election reform movement is alive and evolving, taking the best of what we can all contribute and repurposing where practical to achieve shared goals. Good for us!
0 comments
BlackBoxVoting.org posting from 11/17/05 - contains detailed explanations of successful exploitation of Diebold defects, including the GEMS central tabulator software used to count votes in Humboldt County.
California Voter Foundation report on 11/21/05 Diebold "no hearing" hearing in Sacramento (McPherson disbanded the Voting Systems and Procedures Panel leaving election reform advocates to testify before a group without any authority or even advisory capacity).
California Election Protection Network (CEPN) - home page currently has report on 11/21/05 hearing, plus background on Diebold and HAVA (may be outdated because there is no archived link)
BlackBoxVoting.org posting from 11/22/05 - very interesting announcement that McPherson has set up a public "test hack" for BBV experts; postings added from 11/25 on indicate the initial date of 11/30 has been postponed to a mid-December date still to be determined.
Oakland Tribune - 11/27/05 article confirming test hack will happen but conditions still being negotiated; article also confirms Humboldt among impacted Counties.
Agenda, Voting Systems Testing Summit 2005 - the wheels will keep spinning this Monday and Tuesday in Sacramento. Among the topics of discussion:
And one more link, from Dan Ashby, a Berkeley organizer I met in Portland at the National Summit to Save Our Elections. Dan compiled a comprehensive document full of info for opposing Diebold, including sample letters and official Sacto contact info. It is important to note that faxing comments is more impactful than e-mail, and more timely given that snail mail won't arrive in time for tomorrow's deadline on public comment.Can States or Vendors Help Speed Up the Process and Still Protect the Integrity of the Vote? How Can Test Processes and Results be Shared? Are Standards Getting Increasingly Tougher? Should They? Should Different Tests Be Applied to Different Types of Voting Systems? Are Parallel Testing Programs a Good Idea? What Do They Prove? Source Code -– How Much Should Be Reviewed? By Whom? Is State Certification Necessary or Is Federal Testing Sufficient?
There is lots going on here at GuvWurld. Tomorrow morning I will release a follow-up on last week's GAO report analysis. Some local media have responded well and I expect some coverage this week. However, your insistence on thorough investigative reporting is essential. This community should not accept those who refuse to reveal or seek to hide the truth about the state of our elections. Revisit that post for a list of local media and government contacts. I'll be doing outreach to Humboldt County Supervisors tomorrow too, calling for support of both the GAO report investigation and the Diebold resistance.
And a final note on the overall election reform movement. Yesterday I posted about the Eureka Greens adopting the Voter Confidence Resolution (VCR). This happened without my involvement or knowledge. I believe this indicates the VCR has begun to take on a life of its own. Further, the CEPN reference above contains a section called the 7 Reasons Not To Certify Diebold. The first reason is the GEMS defect and it quotes (without permission or credit) two paragraphs from my GAO report analysis. Going a step further, Dan Ashby included the 7 reasons in the piece linked above, and he kept the two paragraphs with some minor word tweaks. This is in no way a complaint about plagiarism. Quite the opposite. What I see is that the election reform movement is alive and evolving, taking the best of what we can all contribute and repurposing where practical to achieve shared goals. Good for us!
0 comments
0 Comments:
